To Be or Not To Be and What To Be
The Question of Status for Puerto Rico
In 1493, on his second journey to the Americas, Christopher Columbus landed on the island of Borinquen, ushering in an era of slavery, genocide, and colonialism. Since that time, Borinquen – renamed Puerto Rico by the Spanish conquerors – has fought, both physically and ideologically to establish its own identity. In the 1850s, the United States of America had begun to set its sights on the islands of the Caribbean, namely Cuba and Puerto Rico. Under the pretext of national security, U.S. leaders decided that any European presence in the Western Hemisphere was a threat to their sovereignty, and began to make plans for undisputed control of the region. In 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War – fought under this very pretext – the naval forces of the United States invaded the town of Guanica, and took control of the island.
Initially, U.S. occupiers were welcomed by the people of Puerto Rico; indeed they were seen as liberators. Surely the United States, who only a little over one hundred years earlier had shucked the noose of their own oppressors in Britain, understood the necessity of Puerto Rico as a free and sovereign nation. It would not be long, however, before the hopes instilled in the U.S. liberators yielded to a rather ironic reality. In truth, the removal of Spain from Puerto Rico only traded one form of control for another; Puerto Rico went from being a Spanish colony to a U.S. colony.
Puerto Rico became a protectorate of the U.S., which came with certain privileges and freedoms not present under Spain, but its inhabitants still did not enjoy the same rights as full-fledged citizens of the mainland.
As the political climate shifted and colonialism became less and less tolerable in the global consciousness, it became inevitable that Puerto Rico’s status would be called into question. In 1917, the people of Puerto Rico were granted U.S. citizenship under the Jones-Shafroth Act, a victory of sorts, but they still could not vote for U.S. legislators or President who made the ultimate decisions governing their lives. In the 1940s there was another nominal victory, as Puerto Ricans were given the right to democratically elect their own officials, and with it, local sovereignty. Yet still, supreme power over the island resided with the U.S. government, where the people had no true representation. In 1952, Puerto Rico adopted its own constitution, and its status as a Commonwealth, which has prevailed into the present day. As of this writing, Puerto Rico is one of the few remaining “unofficial” colonies of the world, a world where the United Nations officially condemns the existence of such relationships between nations.
According to Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, Article 73:
“Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote…self-government… and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions…”
Through over a hundred years U.S. occupation, Puerto Rico has been divided with regards to what its status should be. Eventually three major political parties emerged – the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the New Progressive Party (PNP), and the Independence Party (PIP) – each espousing its own particular stance on the issue. When discussing the issue of Puerto Rico’s status, it is important to understand the varying ideologies of the people involved.
Puerto Rico’s status as a Commonwealth allows it some autonomy; as previously mentioned, they elect their own governor, as well as appointing the members of bicameral legislature – House and Senate – modeled after that of the U.S. Their laws, however, still fall under the purview of the U.S. Constitution. The PDP, whose members are known as populares, originally favored independence, but then began to support the Commonwealth, albeit with the opinion that some improvements were necessary. It believes that Commonwealth status provides the best balance between autonomy and the maintenance of Puerto Rican identity and culture. In this age of globalization, the undercurrent of which is U.S. cultural hegemony, fears of cultural displacement are well warranted. This issue, in fact, remains the major point of contention between the populares and their primary opponents in the New Progressive Party. For them, the statehood option carries with it the inevitable consequence of complete assimilation.
An example frequently cited is the fact that English is the official language of the United States by law, and it is not expected that an exception would be made for mostly Spanish-speaking Puerto Rico if it became a state. Another example would be Puerto Rico’s national sports teams and separate representation in the Olympics, both of which are major sources of national pride and identity for Puerto Ricans. In 1998, preliminary motions to preserve both Spanish as Puerto Rico’s official language in the event of statehood, and maintaining the island’s national sports teams, were put before Congress where they were summarily and almost unanimously rejected. The independence option, for the PDP, represents possibly losing all of the benefits that have come with being a Commonwealth, such as U.S. citizenship.
The New Progressive Party, whose supporters are known as penepés, is in favor of Puerto Rico being incorporated as the 51st U.S. state, and is the primary opposition for the PDP. While the PDP is almost unconditionally aligned with U.S. Democrats, the PNP is divided, although most of its leadership has formed alliances with Republicans. This relationship will be explored again later in this paper, as it is important to understanding the motivations of those arguing the Puerto Rican status issue, both on the island and in the U.S.
The Puerto Rican Independence Party, as its name suggests, is in favor of complete autonomy for Puerto Rico. Like the PDP, they fear cultural assimilation and the loss of Puerto Rican identity, but they also feel that the current Commonwealth status, where the people have no real control over the ultimate decisions made for their lives (by the U.S. Congress) is unacceptable and in effect keeps Puerto Rico as one of the last remaining colonies. They do, however, understand Puerto Rico’s economic dependence on the U.S., and their plan for separation would necessarily involve extensive and prolonged aid until an independent economy was securely established.
Therefore, in order for the country not to plunge into Third World destitution, or to become subject to the whims of organized crime and drug traffickers, the United States, much like an actual parent, would have to provide economic support for at least ten years. There has been a shift in this ideology within the past 20 years; however, as independence advocates have begun to recognize the possibility of a truly self-sustaining socialist Puerto Rico. The plan would have to include the nationalization of public goods and services, which currently are controlled by private (and mostly U.S. based) companies, such as banks and telecommunications. It would also require a return to a more agriculture-based economy, where Puerto Rico has a great deal of unexploited resources.
The island has 1,200,000 acres of arable land. Only half of it is at present under cultivation, and of this 60 per cent is not fully used. The remaining 40 per cent is only occasionally or little used. This means that only 30 per cent of the total is fully used. The potential increase in agriculture is obviously enormous. (Crip, p. 160)
It is important to note, that ever since the start of U.S. occupation, PIP supporters – known as independentistas – have been the extreme minority. Their constituency is composed mostly of the wealthy and academic elite, who stand to lose the least in terms of their livelihoods, in the transition from commonwealth to independence. Since 1952, when Puerto Rico gained local sovereignty, three referendums have been held – in 1967, 1993, and 1998 – to determine the public sentiment with regards to the status question. Each time the people have been almost equally divided between the ideals of remaining as a Commonwealth and becoming the 51st U.S. state. The following chart shows the results of the referenda by percentage of the vote.
| 1967 | 1993 | 1998 | |
| Commonwealth | 60% | 49% | 0.5% |
| Statehood | 39% | 46% | 46% |
| Independence | 1% | 4% | 2.5% |
| None of the Above | — | — | 50%* |
| Voter Turnout | 70% | 74% | 71% |
The percentage marked with an asterisk does not reflect a decline in support for the PDP; in fact the party encouraged its constituency to choose the “none of the above” option, for reasons that will be explained later in this paper. The results of the 2004 elections reflect the same sentiments. The incumbent governor of Puerto Rico, Anibal Acevedo Vila, is a member of the PDP. Meanwhile, the PDP holds 9 of 27 seats in the Senate and 18 of 51 in the House. The PNP holds 17 seats in Senate and 32 seats in the House. The PIP only holds one seat in each. In addition, Puerto Ricans elect a resident commissioner, who serves in the capacity of a representative in the U.S. House, only without the ability to vote. The current commissioner is Luis Fortuno of the PNP. As these numbers indicate, the only true consensus in Puerto Rico appears to be that the country should not be independent. This would appear to correspond to the fact that the majority of people in Puerto Rico are middle or lower class, and stand to lose a great deal in the early years of autonomy.
The issue of Puerto Rico’s status cannot be discussed without mentioning two critical pieces of legislature drafted in the U.S. Congress in 1996. These were House Resolution 856 and Senate Resolution 472, known collectively as the Young and Craig Bill, named for its authors, Senator Larry Craig of Idaho and Representative Don Young of Alaska. The primary purpose of the bills was to hold a referendum, presenting Puerto Ricans with several options for their future. Initially there were only two choices – statehood and independence – a fact that immediately alienated the PDP and its supporters, who wished to sustain the Commonwealth. In 1998, a series of amendments were proposed, one of which added the Commonwealth choice to the referendum, but in a way that still resulted in opposition from the PDP. Commonwealth would be an option, but not a permanent one, subject to review every 10 years, at which time the citizens would vote again. It was still assumed that the consensus would eventually lean towards either statehood or independence.
Others, such as Senator Luis Gutierrez of Illinois, and Representative Nydia Velasquez of New York, while not aligned with the PDP, opposed the bill for their own reasons. It was noted that no matter the results of the referendum, the U.S. Congress still had the final word, and were under no legal obligation to adhere to any of the options. Velasquez in particular felt that the bill should leave the ultimate decision on Puerto Rico’s status to Puerto Ricans, that is, that the results of the referendum should be the final word.
According to Velasquez:
“These bills are not the result of a democratic process. They do not define all the choices to the satisfaction of the very people who will participate in the plebiscite. By defeating these bills we will be sending a message that we truly honor the idea of self-definition for the people of Puerto Rico.” (U.S. Cong. Hearings, p. 93)
The Young and Craig Bill passed through the house, and on July 14th and 15th of 1998, mere days before the 100 year anniversary of U.S. control of Puerto Rico, a Senate hearing was held which was expected to determine the island’s fate. Although the bill would never receive any serious consideration, thus leaving the status question still unresolved, the different views presented at the hearings are worth examining. Representatives from all three political parties were present at the hearing, and plead their cases for or against the bill. The PDP criticized the bill as being “pro-Statehood”, as being masterminded by PNP leader Pedro Rosello. This accusation, however, was criticized as being dubious, as it was also the PDP’s opinion that Congress would never support Puerto Rico’s statehood.
As Rosello himself argued in an interview:
How is it that a Congress that would be opposed to statehood for Puerto Rico on the other hand is approving a bill that is favorable to statehood?” (Murillo, p. 38)
The hearing would see much of this kind of flawed logic from both sides, which in the opinion of this writer showcases the duality of Puerto Rican officials, in rejecting cultural assimilation on one hand, yet readily adopting the spurious political methodology characteristic of the United States. For example, almost comically, representatives from both the PDP and PNP used the same gimmick to plead their cases.
According to Jose Fuentes-Agostini, then Attorney General of Puerto Rico:
“While 95 percent of the governed people of Puerto Rico in 1993 voted in favor of permanent union between Puerto Rico and the United States and irrevocable U.S. citizenship, 51 percent, a majority, voted for a relationship other than the current one [Commonwealth].” (U.S. Cong. Hearings, p. 9)
According to Anibal Acevedo Vila, then president of the PDP, and pro-Commonwealth advocate:
“In the last plebiscite in 1993, 53 percent of the people voted against statehood.” (U.S. Cong. Hearings, p. 17)
Here both men are referring to the referendum of 1993, and if we look at the figures from that vote, there is something interesting to recognize. The numbers cited, 51% and 53%, represent the pro- Statehood and pro-Commonwealth vote, respectively, but also each separately adds the independent vote. Each side, in attempting to show that the Puerto Rican majority voted against the position of their opposition, failed to point out that a part of those percentages – indeed an amount required to cite a majority – voted against their position as well. It is this kind of political maneuvering that raises the question of whose interests are truly at the heart of each agenda. Neither the PDP nor the PNP has been able to secure majority support for their position, and even if they did, there would still be a large number of Puerto Ricans – in excess of 40% – who would be against it. The interests of more than 1.6 million are not negligible. So in whose interests are these officials lobbying?
Let us take a closer look at each party, and attempt to determine with whose interests their goals align. The PDP, as stated earlier, almost unequivocally ally themselves with the U.S. Democratic Party. The PDP, in arguing against statehood, made it a point to appeal to the fears of the Republican controlled Congress. If Puerto Rico became a state, that would create two more Senate seats and at least seven House seats, which considering the interests of Puerto Ricans, could and probably would be enough to swing control of either or both bodies back to the Democratic Party. This presents an interesting conundrum, and begs the question of why the PDP would speak out against something that would conceivably empower their Democratic congressional allies, all for the sake of maintaining support for their pro-Commonwealth position. This seeming paradox only makes sense when one realizes that there are other interests being served through these high power alliances.
Luis Munoz Marin, founder of the PDP, by way of his pivotal Operation Bootstrap, gave American industry a number of incentives to establish operations in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico enticed US companies by providing labor at costs below those on the mainland, access to US markets without import duties, and profits that could enter the country free from federal taxation. Fomento invited investment of external capital, importing the raw materials, and exporting the finished products to the U.S. market. To entice participation, tax exemptions and differential rental rates were offered for industrial facilities.
There is no question that these measures revitalized the Puerto Rican economy overall, but unfortunately it came at the cost of instituting a quintessentially American economic structure – a large disparity between rich and poor. The PDP’s political allegiances have hardly changed from that time. As of the mid to late 70s, the PDP’s stance could be seen through the actions of Teodoro Moscosco, then head of the Economic Development Administration.
[Moscosco]…is a strong believer in the benefits of having more American capital and more American industry in Puerto Rico. Moscosco also wants wages to be kept low so factories will remain here. He himself is a millionaire, yet he is against a Puerto Rican man or woman earning even a most modest living wage to support a family. (Crip, p. 72)
If you are a millionaire under the current system, it seems a foregone conclusion that you would be apprehensive towards any changes (i.e. statehood or independence) that may affect your livelihood.
On the other side, the leadership of the PNP aligns itself with the U.S. Republican party. Both Don Young and Larry Craig, authors of the bill, were Republicans, which as mentioned earlier was suggested as being inherently pro-statehood. Although the leadership of the PNP allies itself with the G.O.P., the general constituency of the PNP would likely vote Democratic upon the establishment of statehood. Therefore, it would seem contrary to the position of U.S. Republicans to incorporate a new state, if doing so would create a powerful and mostly Democratic voting bloc, enough to cost them control of the House and/or Senate.
Studies conducted in 1996 and 1998 by the Congressional Budget Office estimated the impact of Puerto Rican Statehood on Federal Income Tax Revenues. The study determined that on the individual level, the amount of money paid in taxes by Puerto Ricans would be offset by Earned Income Credit refunds. However, with the new Taxpayer Relief Act, Puerto Ricans would receive child tax credits as well, which would result in a net loss of Federal Income Tax Revenue by around $200 million. Relative to the vast amount of revenue taken in taxes in America, this is a negligible figure, but certainly wouldn’t justify statehood to U.S. government officials. The study also gave estimates for the new amount of tax revenues that would be generated by Puerto Rican corporations, giving a range of 1 to 4.6 billion dollars, the exact amount depending on certain specific decisions made by those corporations. It is no secret that U.S. Republican interests are firmly aligned with those of large corporations. Even this letter indicates that the primary concern is U.S. tax revenue, not the welfare of the people of Puerto Rico.
Speak as they will about what the “majority” of Puerto Ricans want, both PDP and PNP officials clearly have separate interests that not only fail to serve, but often oppose the interests of their constituents. Still, given public fears over loss of U.S. citizenship and the status privileges that come with being a Commonwealth, it is not difficult to grasp why the majority of Puerto Ricans do not support independence.
Given the moral ambiguity of both the PDP and the PNP, it is easy to understand the idealistic desires of the independentistas. However, even conceding to the PNP officials their private bounties there are many strong pro-Puerto Rican arguments to be found under the umbrella of the pro-Statehood position. A good example is the so-called “radical statehood” argument, spearheaded by University of Puerto Rico professors Juan Duchesne and Aurea María Sotomayor. In the controversial article, Statehood from a Radical Democratic Perspective, published in the university newspaper, Dialogo, the radical statehooders were quick to point out the dubious political motives and alliances of the mainstream pro-Statehood advocates. They aimed to show, much to the chagrin of his former pro-Independence colleagues, that the Puerto Rican statehood was not inalienably tied to pro-American hegemony.
Unlike some traditional statehood advocates, those of us who are arguing for a radical statehood don’t want to “Americanize” by assimilating culturally, nor are we agreeing with RodU’s famous dictum, in Ariel, of “admiring, but not loving” the North American people. We don’t admire them, and we don’t love them; we simply recognize our democratic possibilities from a practical standpoint. (Duchesne, et. al, 1997)
Furthermore, they point out that those in the United States, who support Puerto Rican independence, do so for reasons far from being in the interests of Puerto Rican people. In fact, they tend to be “racist, misogynist, homophobic and anti-environmentalist.” A comparison can be made here to those white Americans who in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War, avidly supported the “back to Africa” movement, not merely to help freed slaves reconnect with their native heritage, but to get rid of them, and “keep America for Americans”. Also, considering the political pitfalls for the U.S. Republicans associable with statehood mentioned above (and undoubtedly these same “social conservatives” align themselves with the G.O.P.), what on the surface seems to be “pro-Independence” is actually selfish and ethnocentric.
The radical statehood argument is hinged upon the idea that Puerto Rico as the 51st state would give the island’s citizens true power of self-determination, the power to shape the policies that directly controls their lives, and all the rights and privileges that are afforded all Americans. Statehood under this pretext would provide an “in” to the most powerful machine in global politics and economics. They argue that the pro-Statehood label only applies to them as far as it is a practical solution to the Puerto Rican dilemma, and no way means they advocate a renunciation of national identity.
As of this writing, the Puerto Rican status question remains without an answer. While there is strength in all three of the classic arguments – for statehood, independence, or sustaining the Commonwealth – the issue must be addressed in a way that distinguishes between idealism and feasible realities. Corporate and wealthy private interests need to be recognized and isolated from the ideologies in which they are so cleverly concealed, and the decision has to be made with respect to the needs of the average Puerto Rican citizen.
Sources:
- Crip, Louise L. 1976. Puerto Rico: The Case for Independence. Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company.
- Murillo, Mario. 2001. Islands of Resistance: Puerto Rico, Vieques, and U.S. Policy. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Sariola, Sakari. 1979. The Puerto Rican Dilemma. New York: National University Publications.
- U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate. 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 July 1998.
- White, James R. Letter to Don Nickles, United States Senate, Puerto Rico: Potential Federal Income Tax Revenues Resulting from Statehood, 8 July 1998.
- Various Authors. 2004 – 2006. Operation Bootstrap. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bootstrap (accessed April 17, 2006)
- Duchesne, Juan, and Sotomayor, Aurea M., et. al. 1997. Statehood From a Radical-Democratic Perspective. Dialogo. July Edition.